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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
the state. These men inflicted severe punishment and even death
on those falling within their grasp and a desperate remedy was
needed. It was to punish and suppress such combinations and
conspiracies that the act was passed. State v. Bingham, 42 W. Va.
234, 24 S.E. 883 (1896); State v. Porter, 25 W. Va. 685 (1885).
The crime of conspiracy is complete with the unlawful combina-
tion and is punishable whether or not the contemplated crime is
consummated. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947). The
real purpose of such a statute, then, is to make punishable such
unlawful confederations. It is unfortunate that West Virginia's con-
spiracy statute is of such a nature as to prevent its full use in the
punishment of a conspiracy to murder where the murder is also
charged, without constituting former jeopardy in a later prosecution
for the same murder.
Forest Jackson Bowman
Master and Servant-Fraud in the Inducement of an Employment
Contract-Effect Under Federal Employers' Liability Act
P brought an action under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 - 60 (1952), to recover for injuries caused
by D's negligence. D contended that P was not entitled to recover
because D had hired P in reliance on P's false representations con-
cerning his physical condition. Therefore, P was not an "employee"
within the meaning of the statute. The trial court's action in directing
a verdict for D was sustained by the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Held, reversed. To facilitate congressional policy expressed in the
act, the word "employee" must be interpreted in its ordinary mean-
ing, and generally, the status of employees who gain their position
by fraud must be recognized for the purposes of the act. Still v.
Norfolk & W. Ry., 82 Sup. Ct. 148 (1961).
In the instant case, the Supreme Court has limited the doctrine
established by Minneapolis St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Rock, 279
U. S. 410 (1929), to the "precise facts" of that case, and em-
ployees guilty of the precise kind of fraud perpetrated in that case
may be barred from recovering under the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act. The purpose of this comment is to discuss the effects
of the limitation of that doctrine.
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The plaintiff in the Rock case had applied for a railroad switch-
man's job and was rejected as physically unfit. He re-applied under
an assumed name, arranged for another man to take the required
physical examination in his place, and was subsequently hired. One
year later he was injured because of the railroad's negligence. His
physical defects were not a contributing cause of the injury. It was
held that, because of his fraud, plaintiff was not an employee of
the railroad and the employment contract was void. From this de-
cision the principle was established that any false representation
made by a worker to induce a railroad to enter into an employment
contract will subsequently serve as a bar to an action for damages
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
The Rock doctrine began to be limited within three years after
the decision. The Supreme Court refused to apply the rule in
Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Borum, 286 U. S. 447 (1932).
Borum had misrepresented his age to gain employment. The Court
found no evidence that Borum's false statements substantially af-
fected the examining surgeon's conclusion that he was in good health,
and allowed him to recover.
Some courts adopted an exception to circumvent the doctrine.
In Phillips v. Southern Pac. R.R., 14 Cal. App.2d 454, 58 P.2d 688
(1936), the court recognized the Rock holding but urged that the
better rule is that fraud does not prevent recovery unless a causal
connection between the injuries and the fraud can be shown. The
same exception is relied on in Eresafe v. New York, N. H. & H.
R.R., 250 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1957), and White v. Thompson, 181
Kan. 485, 312 P.2d 612 (1957). In the principal case the Supreme
Court indicates that this distinction is entirely artificial because there
was no causal connection between fraud and injury in the Rock case.
Courts have refused to apply the Rock doctrine in other fact
situations. For example, misrepresentation as to former place of
employment was held not sufficient fraud to bar an action for dam-
ages in Quails v. Atchison T. & S. F. R.R., 112 Cal.App. 7, 296
Pac. 645 (1931), and misrepresentations as to injuries received
while working for a former employer was no bar to an action for
damages in Dawson v. Texas & P. R.R., 123 Tex. 191, 70 S.W.2d
392, (1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 580 (1934). See generally,
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The few cases found where the Rock decision was actually
followed all concern facts in which the employee misrepresented his
physical condition. In Spicer v. Pennsylvania R.R., 196 F.Supp.
679 (E.D. Pa. 1961), decided approximately four months prior to
the principal case, the court granted defendant's motion to amend
his answer and raise a defense based on false statements in plain-
tiff's employment contract, stating it was a ". . . well recognized
defense in actions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act."
Cases with similar holdings are: Southern Pac. Ry. v. Libbey, 199
F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1952); Talarowski v. Pennsylvania R.R., 135 F.
Supp. 503 (D. Del. 1955); Clark v. Union Pac. R.R., 70 Idaho 70,
211 P.2d 402 (1949); Fort Worth & D. C. R.R. v. Griffeth, 27
S.W.2d 351 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
Another criticism of the Rock doctrine is that it had the effect
of creating an exception to the general rule of contract law that
fraud in the formation of a contract, which does not reach the
factum of the contract, renders it voidable, but not void. Laughter
v. Powell, 219 N.C. 689, 14 S.E.2d 826 (1941). In Sass v. Craw-
ford, 89 S.W. 656 (Ind. Terr. Ct. App. 1905), a case involving
fraud reaching the factum of the contract, the court stated that the
fraud rendered the contract absolutely void in respect to the guilty
party and that ". . . it is available to him for no purpose." Also,
the defrauded party must elect either damages or recision of the
contract which remains valid until avoided. It then becomes void
"ab initio." Yost v. Seigrfried, 234 S.W.2d 231 (Mo. Ct. App.
1950); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 166 (1939). Avoidance of the con-
tract by the defrauded party, however, does not retroactively dis-
solve the master-servant relationship which existed while the contract
was in force to bar recovery under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act. Payne v. Daugherty, 283 F. 353 (8th Cir. 1922); Laughter v.
Powell, supra. The cases interpreting the Rock doctrine have not
involved fraud reaching the factum of the contract, but the court
in Newkirk v. Los Angeles J. Ry., 21 Cal.2d 308, 131 P.2d 535
(1942), where Rock is distinguished on the ground that the plaintiff
was never employed by the railroad because his employment applica-
tion had been previously rejected, seems to imply that fraud reaching
the factum of the contract occurred in the Rock case.
The basis for the Rock decision is grounded entirely on public
policy. The purpose of the decision was to ensure the safety of
the traveling public by discouraging physically unfit persons from
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falsifying employment applications to obtain jobs in violation of
railroad safety requirements. The Rock doctrine might never have
arisen if the fraud perpetrated by Rock had not been so outrageous
as to shock the sensibility of the Supreme Court. Minneapolis St.
P. & Ste. M. Ry. v. Rock, supra; Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M.
Ry. v. Borum, supra. Despite the public protection basis for the
doctrine it has been urged that application of the doctrine will have
no effect in deterring job applicants from making false statements
to gain employment. Merrill, Misrepresentation to Secure Employ-
ment, 14 MINN. L. REv. 646 (1930).
It is clear that the Rock doctrine actually has had little effect
in advancing the public policy which it was intended to support.
Evidence of this failure can be found in the many cases which have
arisen since the Rock decision where fraud in the employment con-
tract has been introduced as a defense. The decision has failed to
provide an adequate standard for the courts to follow when applying
the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act and has served
only to confuse the application of a clear policy stated by Congress
in that act.
Herbert Stephenson Boreman, Jr.
Sales-Additional Responsibility of Manufacturers-New Car Sales
P purchased a new car from a dealer which was destroyed by
fire ten days after purchase. P contended that it was caused by
faulty wiring and sued both the dealer and the manufacturer for
the damage to the car. The lower court directed a verdict for both
Ds, but the Supreme Court of Iowa held that in spite of an express
warranty which limited liability, the case could go to the jury against
both Ds on an implied warranty theory. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 110 N:W.2d 449 (Iowa 1961).
This recent case illustrates a line of decisions which gives the
purchaser of a new automobile some protection from the common
law doctrine of "caveat emptor." Many car dealers are selling new
cars with a uniform warranty and disclaimer which gives a purchaser
very little protection against mechanical defects. This line of cases
disregards the disclaimer and gives the purchaser the right to sue
on an implied warranty theory.
From a position of almost total immunity from suit the manu-
facturer now finds himself in quite a different position. It was origi-
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